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A BRIEF REVIEW OF CAS DOPING JURISPRUDENCE 
ISSUES 
Matthew J. Mitten* 
This article briefly summarizes several leading, recent Court of Ar-
bitration for Sport arbitration awards interpreting and applying the 
2015 World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) and, in a few instances, its 2009 
or 2003 prior versions.  It provides a primer regarding various issues 
frequently arising in Olympic and international sports doping cases, in-
cluding proof of Anti-doping Rule Violations (ADRVs) by nonanalytical 
positive evidence; rebuttal of presumed intentional ADRVs; proof of an 
athlete’s no fault or no significant fault; determination of an athlete’s 
appropriate period of ineligibility less than the presumptive standard 
sanction for an ADRV; and determination of the appropriate period of 
disqualified competition results and period of ineligibility start date.  It 
also identifies and describes other CAS awards resolving important 
WADC issues, including the International Olympic Committee’s broad 
authority to retest athlete samples from prior Olympic Games for the 
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Since the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) became effec-
tive on January 1, 2015, there have been hundreds of published Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) awards interpreting and applying its provi-
sions to a wide range of unique factual circumstances.  A book or very 
lengthy article would be required to discuss all of the numerous issues 
resolved by CAS adjudication; some of the most important ones are sum-
marized in the “Leading Cases” section of the CAS Bulletin or discussed 
in various articles published in it.1  This short article briefly discusses 
recent illustrative CAS jurisprudence regarding the above issues under 
the 2015 WADC (or, in a few cases, the 2009 or 2003 WADC), which 
were the subject of the author’s presentation during the General 
 
 1. See, e.g., Estelle de La Rochefoucauld, A Brief Review of the Procedural and Sub-
stantive Issues in CAS Jurisprudence Related to Some Russian Anti-Doping Cases, 1 CAS 
BULL. 21 (2018) (Switz.); Markus Manninen & Brent J. Nowicki, “Unless Fairness Requires 
Otherwise,” A Review of Exceptions to Retroactive Disqualification of Competitive Results 
for Doping Offenses, 2 CAS BULL. 7 (2017); Despina Mavromati, Application of the 2015 
WADA Code Through the Example of a Recent CAS Award (Sharapova v. ITF), 2 CAS BULL. 
7 (2016). 
 
2020] CAS DOPING JURISPRUDENCE ISSUES 309 
Programme of the CAS Seminar in Budapest, Hungary on October 24, 
2019.2 
II. PROOF OF ANTI-DOPING RULE VIOLATION (ADRV) BY NON-
ANALYTICAL POSITIVE (NAP) 
Read together, Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the 2015 WADC provide that 
an ADRV “may be established by any reliable means, including admis-
sions,” to the “comfortable satisfaction” of CAS panel/sole arbitrator.3 
In IAAF v. ARAF, the International Association of Athletics Feder-
ations (IAAF)4 charged Mariya Savinova-Farnosova, a Russian athlete 
specializing in the 800 meters event,5 with an ADRV (specifically, use 
or attempted use of a prohibited substance or method) based on her ab-
normal Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) values and admissions that 
she had used Parabolan, testosterone, and rHGH in conversations with 
Yuliya Stepanova (a Russian athlete whistle blower), which she covertly 
and illegally recorded.6  The IAAF brought this ADRV disciplinary ac-
tion as a first instance CAS Ordinary Division proceeding because there 
was no Russian entity with jurisdiction to do so after its November 2015 
suspension of the All Russia Athletics Federation’s membership based 
on a World Anti-doping Agency (WADA) independent commission re-
port finding extensive doping in Russian athletics.7 
In her defense, the athlete contended that this evidence is insuffi-
cient to establish that she committed an ADRV.8  None of her twenty-
eight blood samples from August 2009-March 2015 tested positive for 
an Adverse Analytical Finding (AAF) for any prohibited substance or 
method, and she asserted that the only abnormalities in her ABP were 
caused by her pregnancy.9  She also asserted that the unauthorized 
 
 2. I want to express my gratitude to Jean Phillipe Dubey, Brent Nowicki, and Jeff Benz 
for their assistance in identifying the leading CAS awards addressing these issues. 
 3. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE §§ 3.1, 3.2 (2015). 
 4. Press Release, World Athletics, IAAF unveils new name and logo (June 9, 2019), 
https://www.worldathletics.org/news/press-release/iaaf-unveils-new-name-and-logo (The 
IAAF changed its name to World Athletics in 2019). 
 5. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns v. All Russ. Athletics Fed’n, CAS 2016/O/4481, 
Arbitral Award, 1, 2,  ¶ 3 (2017) (Switz.). 
 6. Id. at 2-6, ¶¶ 6-23, 18, ¶ 79. 
 7. Press Release, World Athletics, IAAF provisionally suspends Russian Member Fed-
eration ARAF (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.worldathletics.org/news/press-release/iaaf-araf-
suspended; Press Release, World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA welcomes Independent 
Commission’s Report into Widespread Doping in Sport (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/media/news/2015-11/wada-welcomes-independent-commissions-report-into-
widespread-doping-in-sport. 
 8. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns v. All Russ. Athletics Fed’n, CAS 2016/O/4481, 
Arbitral Award, 17, ¶ 78 (2017) (Switz.). 
 9. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 14, 27-33, ¶¶ 127-130. 
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recordings of her conversations with Ms. Stepanova were inadmissible 
as evidence in the CAS proceeding because they were obtained illegally 
in violation of Russian and Swiss law, the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights, her privacy and procedural rights, and the principle of good 
faith.10 
The Sole Arbitrator determined that the “reasonably good quality” 
recordings11 and transcripts of the athlete’s admissions are reliable 
means of evidence of her ADRV pursuant to Article 3.2.12  In accordance 
with the balancing test established by the Swiss Federal Tribunal and 
European Court of Justice, he ruled that this evidence is admissible even 
if illegally obtained because “the interest in discerning the truth must 
prevail over the interest of the Athlete that the covert recordings are not 
used against her in the present proceedings.”13  He noted that “the inter-
est in discerning the truth concerning systematic doping in Russia was 
of utmost importance to keep the sport clean and to maintain a level 
playing field among athletes competing against each other”14 as well as 
that “the fight against doping is not only of a private interest, but indeed 
also of a public interest.”15  Because “doping in Russia is widespread and 
has been systematically supported by coaches, clubs and government-
affiliated organisations . . . , the interest in finding the truth must prevail 
and the Athlete should not be allowed to invoke the principle of good 
faith as a defence against gathering illegally obtained evidence.”16 
Following established CAS jurisprudence, the Sole Arbitrator de-
termined that “the ABP is a reliable and accepted means of evidence to 
assist in establishing anti-doping rule violations,” but “that from the 
mere fact that an athlete cannot provide a credible explanation for the 
deviations in his or her ABP it cannot automatically be deduced that an 
anti-doping rule violation has been committed.”17  In other words, “the 
abnormal doping values may not necessarily be explained by doping” 
and there must be convincing evidence that “the abnormal values are 
caused by a ‘doping scenario’. . . from a qualitative interpretation of the 
experts and possible further evidence.”18  He found that the athlete’s ab-
normal ABP was caused by a “doping scenario” because of its “markedly 
 
 10. Id. at 18, ¶ 79. 
 11. Id. at 23, ¶ 108. 
 12. See id. at 19, ¶ 89. 
 13. Id. at 23, ¶¶ 106-07. 
 14. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns v. All Russ. Athletics Fed’n, CAS 2016/O/4481, 
Arbitral Award, 23, ¶ 103 (2017) (Switz.). 
 15. Id. at 23, ¶ 104. 
 16. Id. at 23, ¶ 105. 
 17. Id. at 33-34, ¶¶ 133-137. 
 18. Id. at 34, ¶ 138. 
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higher HGB values in samples that were taken shortly before three major 
competitions (the European Championship in Barcelona, the World 
Championship in Daegu and the Olympic Games in London),” which 
was corroborated by her admissions in the recorded conversations with 
Ms. Stepanova.19  Although none of the evidence was itself sufficient to 
prove blood doping, he determined that all of the evidence established 
that the athlete engaged in blood doping to his comfortable satisfaction.20 
Based on his analysis of all the evidence, the Sole Arbitrator con-
cluded that the athlete used multiple prohibited substances from July 26, 
2010 through August 19, 2013 (the day after the World Championship 
in Moscow) pursuant to a “sophisticated doping plan or scheme over a 
protracted period of time.”21 
The athlete appealed the Sole Arbitrator’s award to the CAS Ap-
peals Division,22 which upheld his determination regarding her ADRV: 
[E]ven if all scenarios other than doping can be excluded (on a bal-
ance of probability), this does not suffice for the Panel to be com-
fortably satisfied that the Athlete committed blood manipulation. In-
stead, the use of a prohibited substance or method must—in 
addition—be a plausible and likely explanation of the values ob-
tained for the Panel to positively assume that the Athlete doped. Such 
assessment must be made based on all evidence before the Panel.23 
The Panel finds that all evidence on file points in the direction that 
blood manipulation by the Athlete is the only remaining and—when 
assessed individually—also the only plausible and likely explanation 
for the Athlete’s abnormal blood values. Blood manipulation is com-
mon in endurance sport. Contrary to what the Appellant submits 
there is a significant correlation between the sporting calendar of the 
Athlete and the variances observed in her blood values. This results 
from a comparison of the in-competition with the out-of-competition 
testing results. These variances observed support the doping sce-
nario, i.e. that the Athlete submitted to blood manipulation in prepa-
ration for the competitions . . . . [B]ased on all the evidence available 
to this Panel, it is convinced with the required degree of proof that a 
doping scenario is the only possible cause of the Athlete’s abnormal 
blood values.24 
 
 19. Id. at 38, ¶ 154. 
 20. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns v. All Russ. Athletics Fed’n, CAS 2016/O/4481, 
Arbitral Award, 38, ¶ 154-55 (2017) (Switz.). 
 21. See id. at 42, ¶ 178, 45, ¶¶ 200-01. 
 22. Farnosova v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS 2017/O/5045, Arbitral Award 
(2018) (Switz.). 
 23. See id. at 33-34, ¶ 120. 
 24. See id. at 34-35, ¶ 123. 
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Before this Panel—unlike before the first-instance proceedings—the 
Athlete has not contested the admissibility of the recordings. For the 
sake of good order, the Panel would like to state that the recordings 
are admissible evidence and refers insofar to the grounds exposed in 
the first-instance proceedings to which it fully adheres.25 
III. RETESTING OF ATHLETE SAMPLES FROM OLYMPIC GAMES AND 
FIRST TWO CAS ADD AWARDS 
Carter v. IOC26 illustrates the lawful broad scope of the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee’s authority to order retesting of athlete urine 
or blood samples from prior Olympic Games for the presence of prohib-
ited substances.27  Nesta Carter, a member of the Jamaican 4x100m relay 
team that won the gold medal at the Beijing Olympics, provided an Au-
gust 22, 2008 sample that was tested by the Beijing laboratory and found 
to be negative for any prohibited substances.28  In March and June, 2016, 
his sample was retested by the Lausanne laboratory pursuant to the 
IOC’s request, and on June 3, 2016, he was notified it tested positive for 
methylhexaneamine (MHA), a stimulant not specifically named in the 
WADA 2008 Prohibited List that has a similar structure and effects as 
the listed stimulant tuaminoheptane.29  On January 25, 2017, the IOC 
Disciplinary Commission determined that Mr. Carter had committed an 
ADRV, disqualified him from the Beijing Olympic Games 4x100m relay 
event, and ordered that he return his gold medal.30 
In his appeal, the athlete requested that the IOC Disciplinary Com-
mission’s decision be set aside because the IOC did not specifically re-
quest that his sample be tested for MHA and that the Lausanne labora-
tory simply used its standard “Dilute and Shoot” sample retesting 
process.31  He contended that the ADRV charge against him breached 
the principle of legal certainty because MHA was not listed in the 
WADA 2008 Prohibited List.32  The athlete also contended that this 
charge should be dismissed because the IOC’s “justification for the re-
testing regime is to enable re-testing where scientific methods have de-
veloped since the time of the original test such that a prohibited sub-
stance could be detected by those methods where it could not have been 
 
 25. See id. at 35, ¶ 125. 
 26. Carter v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS 2017/A/4984, Arbitral Award (2018) (Switz.). 
 27. Id. at 1, ¶ 1. 
 28. Id. at 2, ¶ 1. 
 29. See id. at 1-2, ¶¶ 1-5, 3-4, ¶¶ 10-13. 
 30. Id. at 4-5, ¶ 15. 
 31. Id. at 7-12, ¶ 37. 
 32. Carter v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS 2017/A/4984, Arbitral Award, 7-12, ¶ 37 
(2018) (Switz.). 
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previously” and that Beijing laboratory had the capability to detect MHA 
in athlete samples in August 2008.33  In addition, he asserted that because 
athlete samples have been routinely tested for MHA since 2010, the 
IOC’s delay in retesting Beijing Olympic Games samples for MHA until 
2016 prejudiced him and warranted dismissal of the ADRV charge 
against him.34 
Ruling that “Article 6.5 of the IOC ADR provides a broad and dis-
cretionary power to the IOC to test for any and all prohibited substances 
at any time within the statute of limitation period” (which is eight years 
under the 2003 WADC),35 the CAS Panel upheld the IOC Disciplinary 
Commission’s determination.36  It confirmed the validity of the labora-
tory’s “Dilute and Shoot” sample screening process and found that the 
IOC did not intend “to prevent the Lausanne Laboratory [from reporting] 
any prohibited substance which was part of the in-competition menu” of 
prohibited substances for the Beijing Olympic Games.37  The Panel re-
jected the athlete’s breach of legal certainty defense: “[A]ll stimulants 
were and are prohibited.  There is a great number of stimulants, and they 
cannot all be listed by name.  Therefore, the list of prohibited stimulants 
provides a list of named stimulants, which are typically the ones often 
detected, as well as a ‘hold all basket.’ ” 38 
The Panel found that the IOC’s rules for retesting athlete samples 
“send a message to all participants at the Olympic Games, that they have 
the fundamental duty not to use any prohibited substance,” which “is an 
absolute duty and is not linked with the detectability of a substance.”39  
“In the end, what truly counts is not whether a substance is detected or 
not in a specific analysis performed at a given time in a given laboratory 
but whether it is present or not.”40 It explained that the IOC’s Olympic 
Games’ 
re-analysis program is meant to protect the integrity of the competi-
tion results and the interests of athletes who participated without any 
prohibited substance and not the interests of athletes who were ini-
tially not detected for any reason and are later and within the statute 
 
 33. See id. at 29, ¶ 112. 
 34. See id. at 7-12, ¶ 37. 
 35. See id. at 25, ¶ 88. 
 36. See id. at 28-29, ¶ 109. 
 37. See id. at 27, ¶ 99. 
 38. See Carter v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS 2017/A/4984, Arbitral Award, 35, ¶ 152 
(2018) (Switz.). 
 39. See id. at 31, ¶¶ 123-24. 
 40. See id. at 31, ¶ 127. 
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of limitation period found to have competed with a prohibited sub-
stance in their bodily systems.41 
Consistent with Carter v. IOC, the first two CAS Anti-doping Division 
cases concluded that valid laboratory re-analysis of Olympic Games 
samples finding the presence of prohibited substances supported the de-
termination of an ADRV by the particular athletes resulting in invalida-
tion of their respective competition results.  In Novikau v. IOC, the Sole 
Arbitrator found that the October 2018 re-analysis of a Belarusian 
weightlifter’s 2012 London Olympic Games samples revealed the pres-
ence of dehydrochlormethyltestosterone (an anabolic steroid), which 
constitutes an ADRV invalidating his twelfth-place finish in the men’s 
eighty-five kilogram weightlifting event.42  In IOC v. Nurudinov, the 
same Sole Arbitrator found that the November 2018 re-analysis of an 
Uzbekistani weightlifter’s samples revealed the presence of the same 
prohibited substance, which constitutes an ADRV invalidating his fourth 
place finish in men’s 105 kg weightlifting event at the London Olympic 
Games.43 
IV. ATHLETE REBUTTAL OF PRESUMED INTENTIONAL VIOLATION IF 
ADRV DOES NOT INVOLVE A SPECIFIED SUBSTANCE 
Article 10.2.1.1 of the 2015 WADC provides for a Period of Ineli-
gibility of 4 years if the ADRV does not involve a Specified Substance 
unless the Athlete proves that the ADRV is “not intentional” by “a bal-
ance of probability.”44  If the Athlete does so, the presumptive Period of 
Ineligibility is reduced to two years pursuant to Article 10.2.2.45  Article 
10.2.3 defines “intentional” as “conduct which [an Athlete] knew con-
stituted an anti-doping rule violation or knew that there was a significant 
risk that the conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule vi-
olation and manifestly disregarded that risk.”46 
Applying these WADC provisions, in Taylor v. World Rugby, the 
CAS Panel held that a nineteen-year rugby player who tested positive 
for a metabolite of dehydrochlormethyl-testosterone (“DHCMT”) as 
part of the World Rugby U20 Championship Out of Competition testing 
 
 41. See id. at 33, ¶ 140. 
 42. Novikau v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS 2019/ADD/1, Arbitral Award, 2-3, ¶¶ 4-11, 
6, ¶¶ 40-41 (2019) (Switz.). 
 43. Int’l Olympic Comm. v. Nurudinov, CAS 2019/ADD/2, Arbitral Award, 2-3, ¶¶ 2-
13, 5-6, ¶¶ 37-38 (2019) (Switz.).   
 44. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, supra note 3, §§ 3.1, 10.2.1. 
 45. Id. § 10.2.2. 
 46. Id. §§ 3.1, 3.2, 10.2.3. 
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program proved he did not commit an intentional ADRV.47  He estab-
lished that the likely source of this prohibited substance was Deca-Plexx, 
a contaminated product he took for vanity reasons ten months before his 
positive test.48  He wanted to look good for a high school beach party 
and was not playing rugby while recovering from a broken ankle.49  The 
Panel observed that “[e]stablishment of source does not by itself prove 
negative intent although it may be a powerful indicator of the presence 
or absence of intent.”50  It concluded that the evidence “he took Deca-
Plexx to enhance his body image not his sporting performance, […] was 
entirely convincing”51 and proves no intent to commit an ADRV. 
In contrast, two other cases determined that the athlete failed to re-
but the presumption that testing positive for a prohibited non-specified 
substance constitutes an intentional ADRV. 
In Zieliński v. Polish Anti-Doping Agency, a professional weight-
lifter who won the gold medal in the men’s eighty-five kilogram cate-
gory at the 2012 London Olympic Games, tested positive for 19-nandro-
lone during the 2016 Polish Weightlifting Championships.52  The athlete 
was unable to establish the probable source of this prohibited substance, 
but claimed he “has never knowingly and dishonestly acted to gain an 
unfair sporting advantage,” “would never knowingly use such an easily 
detectable prohibited substance before the Olympic Games,” and “ful-
filled his whereabouts obligations and underwent a significant number 
of anti-doping controls.”53  He also contended that his lack of an intent 
to use this prohibited substance was proven by a polygraph test and three 
negative anti-doping tests for nandrolone (which is detectable for a 
lengthy period of time after its use) soon after his positive test and that 
if taking it “was done with the aim to gain a sporting advantage [,] one 
would need multiple doses thus making it detectable for a period of be-
tween 18-24 months.”54 
The Sole Arbitrator recognized that “[a] line of CAS cases have 
held that in order to meet the athlete’s burden that the violation was not 
intentional [,] the athlete must necessarily establish how the substance 
entered his/her body,” but that “a number of other CAS awards held 
 
 47. See Taylor v. World Rugby, CAS 2018/A/5583, Arbitral Award, 2, ¶¶ 1-5 (2019) 
(Switz.). 
 48. Id. at 22, ¶ 88. 
 49. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 18-20. 
 50. See id. at 22, ¶ 87. 
 51. See id. at 23, ¶ 88 (vi). 
 52. Zieliński v. Polish Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2018/A/5584, Arbitral Award, 2, ¶ 24 
(2019) (Switz.). 
 53. Id. at 22. 
 54. Id. at 47-48. 
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differently, relying in particular on the wording of the new version of the 
2015 WADC, the language of which should be strictly construed without 
reference to case law which considered earlier versions where the ver-
sions are inconsistent.”55  Regarding the later CAS jurisprudence, he 
noted that these awards required “truly exceptional circumstances” to 
prove “lack of intent without establishing the origin of the prohibited 
substance.”56 
Observing that the athlete “cannot merely rely on protestations of 
innocence, lack of a demonstrable sporting incentive to dope, diligent 
attempts to discover the origin of the prohibited substance or [his] clean 
record,”57 to do so, the Sole Arbitrator concluded: “The totality of the 
evidence presented is not sufficient to establish, on the balance of prob-
ability, that the Athlete had no intention to cheat whatsoever [and] are 
not indicative of exceptional circumstances that might negate the pre-
sumed intentionality of the violation.”58 
In WADA v. Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, an out-of-compe-
tition doping control found the presence of exogenously administered 
anabolic steroids in a Chinese female weightlifter’s system.59  The ath-
lete asserted she did not commit an intentional ADRV because the pro-
hibited substance was in Flovone, a supplement she took for severe men-
strual problems based on her physician’s recommendation.60  Even if this 
product was its source, the Sole Arbitrator determined that her ADRV 
was “indirectly intentional within the meaning of Article. 10.2.3 of the 
[2015] WADC] (viz. the Athlete ‘knew that there was a significant risk 
that the conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule violation 
and manifestly disregarded that risk).”61  She used Flovone, whose label 
stated “in major letters circled with a golden ring that it contains DHEA”, 
which is an anabolic steroid, for one week without reading it or “making 
any relevant check” such as an Internet search.62  The Sole Arbitrator 
concluded: 
A language barrier is no defense to an athlete meeting the basic 
standard of conduct of all athletes. If she could not understand the 
ingredients label[] then she either had to find someone who did or 
 
 55. Id. at 47. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Zieliński v. Polish Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2018/A/5584, Arbitral Award, 48, 
(2019) (Switz.). 
 59. World Anti-Doping Agency v. Chinese Taipei Olympic Comm., CAS 2018/A/5784, 
Arbitral Award, 2-3, ¶¶ 4-10 (2018) (Switz.). 
 60. Id. at 5, ¶ 29. 
 61. Id. at 10, ¶ 67. 
 62. See id. at 11, ¶ 69. 
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simply not take the substance. She cannot hide behind her native lan-
guage as a way of avoiding her responsibilities.63 
V. PROOF OF NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE TO ELIMINATE STANDARD 
PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY 
Article 10.4 of the 2015 WADC provides: “If an Athlete or other 
Person establishes in an individual case that he or she bears No Fault or 
Negligence, then the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility shall be 
eliminated.”64  The 2015 WADC defines No Fault or Negligence as fol-
lows:  
The Athlete or other Person’s establishing that he or she did not 
know or suspect, and could not reasonably have known or suspected 
even with the exercise of utmost caution, that he or she had Used or 
been administered the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method 
or otherwise violated an anti-doping rule.  Except in the case of a 
Minor, for any violation of Article 2.1 [presence in sample], the Ath-
lete must also establish how the Prohibited Substance entered his or 
her system.65 
It is extremely difficult for an athlete to prove no fault or negligence 
for an ADRV, and WADA v. Roberts66 is one of the rare cases in which 
it has been proven.  Gil Roberts, an American 200 meter and 400 meter 
sprint athlete who was a member of the 4x400 meter relay team that won 
the gold medal during the 2016 Rio Olympic Games tested positive for 
probenecid, a prohibited specified substance in the category of diuretics 
and masking agents, during an out-of-competition doping control.67  He 
alleged his ADRV resulted from passionately kissing his girlfriend, Re-
becca “Alex” Salazar, for approximately three hours immediately before 
providing his urine sample during the doping control, and that he did not 
know or suspect that kissing her could cause a positive test for probene-
cid.68  She was taking Moxylong capsules, which she did not know con-
tained probenecid, that were purchased in India for her sinus infection.69  
Mr. Roberts did not know she was taking Moxylong or see her take any 
of this medication.70  A laboratory test of her one remaining Moxylong 
 
 63. See id. at 11, ¶ 70. 
 64. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, supra note 3, § 10.4. 
 65. See id. at 137. 
 66. World Anti-Doping Agency v. Roberts, CAS 2017/A/5296, Arbitral Award (2018) 
(Switz.). 
 67. Id. at 1-2, ¶¶ 2-5. 
 68. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 14-19, 16-17, ¶ 63. 
 69. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 14-15. 
 70. Id. at 3, ¶ 18. 
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capsule established that it contained probenecid.71  WADA did not con-
tend that his ADRV was intentional, but asserted that “the Athlete and 
his lay witnesses have concocted a false story to explain an adverse an-
alytical finding.”72  The parties’ scientific evidence was conflicting re-
garding whether the likely source of probenecid in the athlete’s system 
was prolonged contaminated kissing of his girlfriend.73 
Relying on Gasquet,74 which concluded “[i]t was simply impossi-
ble for [a tennis player], even when exercising the utmost caution, to 
know that in kissing [a previously unknown woman in a nightclub mul-
tiple times], he could be contaminated with cocaine,”75 the CAS Panel 
determined: 
[T]o be satisfied that a means of ingestion, is demonstrated on a bal-
ance of probability simply means, in percentage terms, that it is sat-
isfied that there is a 51% chance of it having occurred. The Player 
thus only needs to show that one specific way of ingestion is mar-
ginally more likely than not to have occurred.76 
It found: 
The Panel finds itself faced with compelling factual evidence and, at 
best, conflicting scientific evidence that acts as a double-edge sword 
in determining the truth. Put simply, in its assessment, the scientific 
evidence fails to take this storyline below the requisite of the CAS 
2009/A/1926 & 1930 [Gasquet] threshold. Therefore, the Panel re-
verts to the non-expert evidence and finds itself sufficiently satisfied 
that it is more likely than not that the presence of probenecid in the 
Athlete’s system resulted from kissing his girlfriend Ms. Salazar 
shortly after she had ingested a medication containing probenecid.77 
The CAS Panel concluded that: 
[T]he Athlete has established the origin of the prohibited substance 
on a balance of probabilities . . . [E]ven with the exercise of the ut-
most caution, [he] could never have envisioned that kissing his girl-
friend of three years would lead to an adverse analytical finding for 
trace amounts of a banned substance that he was not familiar with, 
. . . [He] acted without fault or negligence.78 
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VI. PROOF OF NO SIGNIFICANT FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE TO REDUCE 
STANDARD PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY AND DETERMINATION OF 
REDUCED PERIOD 
Article 10.5.1.1 (“Specified Substances”) of the 2015 WADC pro-
vides:  
Where the anti-doping rule violation involves a Specified Substance, 
and the Athlete . . . can establish No Significant Fault or Negligence, 
then the period of Ineligibility shall be, at a minimum, a reprimand 
and no period of Ineligibility, and at a maximum, two years of Ineli-
gibility, depending on the Athlete’s or other Person’s degree of 
Fault.79 
Article 10.5.1.2 (“Contaminated Products”) provides: 
In cases where the Athlete . . . can establish No Significant Fault or 
Negligence and that the detected Prohibited Substance came from a 
Contaminated Product, then the period of Ineligibility shall be, at a 
minimum, a reprimand and no period of Ineligibility, and at a maxi-
mum, two years Ineligibility, depending on the Athlete’s . . . degree 
of Fault.80 
Article 10.5.2 (“Application of No Significant Fault or Negligence 
beyond the Application of Article 10.5.1”) provides:  
If an Athlete . . . establishes in an individual case where Article 
10.5.1 is not applicable, that he or she bears No Significant Fault or 
Negligence, . . . the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility may 
be reduced based on the Athlete[‘s] . . . degree of Fault, but the re-
duced period of Ineligibility may not be less than one-half of the pe-
riod of Ineligibility otherwise applicable.81 
The 2015 WADC defines No Significant Fault or Negligence as 
follows:  
The Athlete or other Person’s establishing that his or her Fault or 
negligence, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances and tak-
ing into account the criteria for No Fault or Negligence, was not sig-
nificant in relationship to the anti-doping rule violation. Except in 
the case of a Minor, for any violation of Article 2.1, the Athlete must 
also establish how the Prohibited Substance entered his or her sys-
tem.82 
Pursuant to Article 10.5.1.1, 10.5.1.2, or 10.5.2, an athlete must 
prove no significant fault or negligence for an ADRV by a balance of 
probability (as well as the source of the prohibited substance) to obtain 
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any reduction of the standard or otherwise applicable period of ineligi-
bility.  The following cases illustrate that determination of whether the 
athlete’s fault or negligence is “significant” requires a detailed fact spe-
cific inquiry. 
In USADA v. Bailey, a “28-year-old experienced elite-level athlete 
who competed at an international level in both athletics and bobsled-
ding,” tested positive for dimethlylbutylamine (DMBA), a stimulant that 
is a specified substance whose usage is prohibited in-competition.83  As-
serting a “mistaken assumption that his teammates were as responsible 
as he had been with respect to their supplement choices,”84 the athlete 
contended he had no significant fault for his ADRV because he took two 
supplements (“Hyde” and “Weapon X”) during a bobsled competition 
supplied by two similarly situated teammates who also tested positive 
for DMBA and accepted a sixteenth-month suspension proposed by the 
United States Anti-doping Agency (USADA).85 
The CAS Panel found his “fault is significant”86 because he was “an 
elite-level international athlete with over 10 years of anti-doping educa-
tion [who] ought to have mentored the less-experienced athletes, not 
blindly followed their lead.”87  It determined that his conduct was “well 
below the standard of expected of such an Athlete,” which “demon-
strated extreme carelessness or recklessness in failing to take even the 
most basic steps to avoid an ADRV.”88  For example, he “did not ask 
anyone for assurances that the substances he ingested were “safe”, did 
not do any research of his own, and in fact, did not even take the most 
basic step of reading the product label before taking it.”89  It concluded 
his conduct does not warrant a finding of no significant fault or negli-
gence justifying any reduction of the standard two-year suspension for 
an ADRV involving a specified substance pursuant to Article 10.5.1.1.90 
Consistent with Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, the CAS Panel 
rejected the athlete’s contention that his attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, which periodically resulted in a lack of focus, hyperactivity, or 
impulsivity, warranted a reduction in his sanction: 
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An athlete who suffers from a disability or impairment that prevents 
him or her from complying with primary WADC obligations should 
either not compete at all or ensure that he is accompanied by a re-
sponsible adult when he or she takes any supplement or medicine, or 
take other appropriate measures, including medically recommended 
measures, to achieve compliance. Mr. Bailey took no such steps.91 
Taylor v. World Rugby92 illustrates that an athlete’s youth, inexperience 
playing sport, and lack of doping education are relevant (but not dispos-
itive) factors in determining the existence of no significant fault or neg-
ligence for an ADRV.  The CAS Panel found that a nineteen-year-old 
rugby player’s “level of fault is significant or considerable”93 for his 
ADRV; therefore, no reduction of the standard two-year suspension for 
his unintentional use of a non-specified substance was warranted under 
Article 10.5.1.2: 
While there is a greater obligation on the part of the experienced 
high-level athlete who has received anti-doping education on numer-
ous occasions, to undertake due diligence, that does not absolve the 
young, inexperienced athlete at the other end of the spectrum from 
taking any steps whatsoever. The Panel is unable to identify any 
steps that the Appellant took in discharge of his duty to avoid the 
presence in his system of prohibited substances. In the Panel’s view, 
the Appellant acted in a careless manner in consuming supplements 
without undertaking any form of research and demonstrated a per-
plexing lack of curiosity for someone who entertained the prospect 
of one day playing professional rugby.94 
In Lea v. USADA, the CAS panel was bound to accept an American Ar-
bitration Association anti-doping panel’s implicit determination that a 
professional cyclist did not have significant fault or negligence for an in-
competition positive drug test for oxycodone (a specified substance) 
caused by taking one tablet of Percocet as a sleep aid late at night ap-
proximately twelve to twelve and a half hours before a morning race the 
next day (which was not appealed by either party).95  A long-time trusted 
sports medicine physician (who had participated in national cycling 
competitions) had prescribed Percocet, a permissible out-of-competition 
medication he knew contained oxycodone, for pain relief on non-riding 
days during multi-day cycling competitions, which was foreseeably used 
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by cyclists as a sleep aid.96  The physician did not warn the athlete about 
the risk of a positive in-competition drug test even if Percocet was taken 
“out-of-competition”97 (defined by the 2015 WADC as “twelve hours 
[or longer] before a Competition in which the Athlete is scheduled to 
participate . . . .”).98 
Witness testimony showed the cyclist was generally aware that me-
tabolites of Percocet’s ingredients, including oxycodone, might remain 
in his system beyond this medication’s period of therapeutic effective-
ness, which is approximately four hours.99  USADA’s Science Director 
testified that oxycodone metabolites can remain in one’s system twenty-
four to seventy-two hours after ingestion, but there was no record evi-
dence that the IF for cycling, USADA, or WADA websites or the Glob-
alDRO.com (the primary Internet resources athletes should check to ob-
tain information about products or substances before taking them) 
contained this information.100  There also was no record evidence that 
any of these resources warned that oxycodone or its metabolites could 
remain in an athlete’s system longer than twelve hours after ingesting it 
and result in a positive in-competition test even if medication containing 
it is taken out-of-competition.101 
The CAS panel generally adopted and modified the Cilic102 guide-
lines for determining an athlete’s degree of fault based on objective and 
subjective elements with a corresponding range of sanctions for ADRVs 
involving specified substances.  To promote consistency in applying Ar-
ticle 10.4 of the 2009 WADC to determine sanctions for ADRVs involv-
ing specified substances, Cilic divided the maximum two-year period of 
ineligibility into three categories of fault: zero to eight months for a 
“light degree of fault” with a standard sanction of four months; eight to 
sixteen months for a “normal degree of fault” with a standard sanction 
of twelve months; and sixteen to twenty-four months for a “significant 
or considerable degree of fault” with a standard sanction of twenty 
months.103  Because Article 10.5.1.1 of the 2015 WADC requires the 
athlete to prove “no significant fault or negligence” to obtain any re-
duced sanction, Lea used the following terminology: zero to eight 
months for a “light degree of fault,” eight to sixteen months for a 
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“moderate degree of fault,” and sixteen to twenty-four months for a 
“considerable degree of fault” with the same “standard” sanctions in 
each category.104 
The CAS panel determined: 
The dispositive inquiry in determining an appropriate, consistent, 
and fair sanction is his degree of fault for not taking reasonable steps 
to determine the length of time oxycodone is likely to remain in his 
system after ingesting it. There is no evidence that Appellant could 
have obtained reliable, scientifically accurate information from any 
of the above-referenced Internet resources normally consulted by 
athletes. Nor is there record evidence he could have obtained reliable 
information from a general Internet search because, as Dr. Fedoruk 
testified, the length of time metabolites of oxycodone are likely to 
remain in one’s system ‘is a challenging question’ and the length of 
time for clearance is different based on the particular individual’s 
metabolism and genetics.105 
Applying the objective element (“what standard of care could have been 
expected from a reasonable person in the athlete’s situation”), the CAS 
Panel characterized the cyclist’s “level of fault for not taking objectively 
reasonable action such as asking his physician the length of time oxyco-
done is likely to remain in his system after ingesting it as ‘moderate’ 
fault.’ ” 106  After considering the subjective mitigating factors (particu-
larly that his “level of awareness has been reduced by a careless but un-
derstandable mistake” and that he “has taken [Percocet] over a long pe-
riod of time without incident”),107 it determined that “the totality of 
circumstances regarding [the cyclist’s ADRV] is an ‘exceptional case’ 
in which the ‘subjective elements are so significant that they move [him] 
not only to the extremity of a particular category, but also into a different 
category altogether.’ ” 108 
The CAS Panel concluded that the cyclist’s level of fault is “light” 
and after considering CAS anti-doping jurisprudence with similar facts, 
it imposed a six-month period of ineligibility, which is two months 
longer than the “standard” four-month suspension in this category of 
fault.109 
In Ibrahim v. West Asia Regional Anti-doping Organization 
(WARADO), during an in-competition doping control, a young Lebanese 
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professional basketball player tested positive for a high concentration of 
THC (a specified substance) from his permissible out-of-competition use 
of marijuana the evening before the game.110  It was undisputed that his 
ADRV was not intentional,111 so he was subject to the standard two-year 
period of ineligibility.112  Pursuant to the WADA Reference Guide, he 
did not have significant fault or negligence for his marijuana usage be-
cause it clearly was unrelated to sports performance.113  FIBA filed an 
amicus brief asserting that his two-year suspension imposed by a 
WARADO Doping Hearing Panel was disproportionate to sanctions im-
posed on other basketball players for in-competition positive tests for 
THC (the FIBA Disciplinary Tribunal’s average suspension was three 
months).114 
Applying Article 10.5.1.1 and relying on Lea, the CAS Panel found 
that the athlete’s degree of fault is in the “light degree category which 
usually leads to a ban of 0-8 months.”115  The CAS Panel concluded: 
[T]he Appellant’s age and behavior would show for a ban of three 
months, however, the proximity of the consumption to the game and 
the cannabis concentration found in the sample show for a ban of 
four months. Therefore, the Panel finds that the athlete’s fault is a 
‘standard’ case of light degree of fault and the appropriate sanction 
is a ban of four (4) months.116 
In Guerrero v. FIFA, a professional football player tested positive for 
the presence of cocaine metabolite, a non-specified substance whose us-
age is prohibited in-competition, is his system.117  Its source was coca 
tea that he drank in the team’s Visitors room in the hotel two days before 
the football competition in which he provided a positive sample.118  He 
mistakenly assumed that all food and drink served therein was subject to 
the same strict protocols as in the private dining room to ensure that 
nothing contained any prohibited substances.119  Before drinking the tea, 
he did not ask team officials about the Visitors room food and drink 
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protocols; nor did he inquire about or inspect the tea bags.120  It was un-
disputed that his ingestion of this prohibited substance occurred out-of-
competition in a context unrelated to sport performance;121 therefore, he 
was subject to being suspended for a maximum period of two years,122 
pursuant to Article 10.2.3 of the 2015 WADC. 
The player contended he should serve no period of ineligibility.123  
FIFA asserted a six-month period was appropriate,124 and WADA re-
quested a twenty-two-month period.125 
The CAS Panel determined the player’s fault for his ADRV “was 
not significant.”126  It concluded he had “light” fault based on the modi-
fied Cilic guidelines,127 which would subject him to a suspension of zero 
to eight months.  However, Article 10.5.2 precluded his otherwise appli-
cable two-year period of ineligibility from being reduced to less than 
one-half of its length (i.e., one year).128  The Panel imposed a suspension 
of fourteen months on the player,129 but with the following caveat: 
Were the Panel entirely unconstrained by the [2015 WADC] as to 
sanction and empowered to determine the appropriate period of in-
eligibility ex aequo et bono, it could entertain with some sympathy 
the argument advanced by FIFA that such period should be no more 
than 6 months suspension in light of [several mitigating factors in 
the player’s favour, including that his ADRV resulted from his con-
sumption “of an ordinary drink which contained, contrary to his rea-
sonable belief, a prohibited substance”].130 
[T]he CAS jurisprudence since the coming into effect of WADC 
2015 is clearly hostile to the introduction of proportionality as a 
means of reducing yet further the period of ineligibility provided for 
by the WADC . . . [because it is] the product of wide consultation 
and represented the best consensus of sporting authorities as to what 
was needed to achieve as far as possible the desired end [and] has 
been found repeatedly to be proportional in its approach to sanc-
tions, and the question of fault has already been built into its assess-
ment of length of sanction.131 
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VII. PERIOD OF DISQUALIFIED COMPETITION RESULTS, PERIOD OF 
INELIGIBILITY START DATE, AND CREDIT FOR A PROVISIONAL 
SUSPENSION 
USADA v. Bailey132 and IAAF v. ADAK, AK & Ngandu Ndegwa133 
provide good examples of the appropriate application of the following 
2015 WADC provisions. 
Article 9: “[An ADRV] in Individual Sports in connection with an 
In-Competition test automatically leads to Disqualification of the result 
obtained in that Competition . . . including forfeiture of any medals, 
points and prizes.”134 
Article 10.8: 
In addition to the automatic Disqualification of the results in the 
Competition which produced the positive Sample . . . all other com-
petitive results . . . from the date a positive Sample was collected . . . 
through the commencement of any Provisional Suspension . . . shall, 
unless fairness requires otherwise, be Disqualified . . . .135 
Article 10.11: “Except as provided below, the period of Ineligibility 
shall start on the date of the final hearing decision . . . .”136 
Article 10.11.2: Where the Athlete . . . promptly (which, in all events, 
for an Athlete means before the Athlete competes again) admits the 
[ADRV] after being confronted with [it] by the Anti-Doping Organ-
ization, the period of Ineligibility may start as early as the date of 
Sample collection . . . [W]here this Article is applied, the Athlete . . . 
shall serve at least one-half of the period of Ineligibility going for-
ward from the date the Athlete . . . accepted the imposition of a sanc-
tion, the date of a hearing decision imposing a sanction, or the date 
the sanction is otherwise imposed.137 
Article 10.11.3.1: “If a Provisional Suspension is imposed and re-
spected by the Athlete . . . , then the Athlete . . . shall receive a credit for 
such period . . . against any period of Ineligibility which may ultimately 
be imposed.”138 
In USADA v. Ryan Bailey, the athlete’s January 10, 2017 in-com-
petition sample tested positive for DMBA, a specified substance whose 
usage is prohibited in-competition, which subjected him to a two-year 
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period of ineligibility.139  He subsequently competed in two bobsled 
competitions until being notified that his “A” sample tested positive for 
DMBA.140  On January 29, 2017, he admitted his ADRV and accepted a 
provisional suspension.141  On August 23, 2017, the AAA anti-doping 
panel disqualified his competition results from January 10, 2017 through 
January 29, 2017 and imposed a six-month suspension beginning on Jan-
uary 10, 2017 that ended on July 9, 2017 because it found he had no 
significant negligence or fault and only a light degree of fault for his 
ADRV.142 
Pursuant to Article 10.11.2, the CAS Panel upheld the disqualifica-
tion of the athlete’s competition results from January 10, 2017 to January 
29, 2017.143  Because it found that he did have significant fault for his 
ADRV, the Panel imposed a two-year suspension.144  In its November 
30, 2017 Operative Award, in accordance with Article 10.11, the Panel 
determined that his two-year period of ineligibility started on November 
30, 2017 and provided credit for the period of the suspension he already 
served from January 29, 2017 to July 9, 2017 pursuant to Article 
10.11.3.1.145 
In IAAF v. ADAK, AK & Benjamin Ngandu Ndegwa, a Kenyan long 
distance runner’s June 6, 2015 in-competition sample tested positive for 
nandrolone.146  He accepted a July 6, 2015 provisional suspension, but 
competed in nine events from February 28, 2016 through February 26, 
2017.147  In its  November 17, 2017 Operative Award, the Panel disqual-
ified all of his competition results from June 6, 2015 to date and sus-
pended him for four years beginning on  November 17, 2017.148  It pro-
vided “no credit for any time he claimed to have been provisionally 
suspended”149 because “where an athlete breaches a period of provi-
sional suspension, he loses the entirety of the credit for such suspension 
(i.e., both the period before and after any breach.”150  The Panel 
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explained: “To permit otherwise, would undermine the purposes of the 
provisional suspension rule.”151 
IAAF v. ARAF, a first instance CAS Ordinary Division doping case, 
and its subsequent appeal to the CAS Appeals Division also provide il-
lustrative guidance in determining the appropriate start date for an ath-
lete’s period of ineligibility and period of disqualified competition re-
sults. 
In IAAF v. ARAF,152 in his February 10, 2017 award, the Sole Ar-
bitrator concluded that the athlete used multiple prohibited substances 
from July 26, 2010 through August 19, 2013, disqualified her competi-
tion results during this time period, and imposed the maximum four-year 
period of ineligibility beginning on August 24, 2015 (the date the IAAF 
provisionally suspended her).153  Applying Rule 40.10 of the IAAF Rules 
(which in relevant part is substantially identical to Article 10.11 of the 
2015 WADC), he explained: “for practical reasons and in order to avoid 
any eventual misunderstanding in the calculation of the period of ineli-
gibility, the period of ineligibility should start on 24 August 2015, the 
date of commencement the provisional suspension and not of the date of 
the award.”154 
In Farnosova v. IAAF,155 the CAS Panel upheld the Sole Arbitra-
tor’s sanctions and explained why they do not violate the principle of 
proportionality: 
The combined effects of such sanction[s] are severe, considering that 
its effective length is close to seven years and that the ADRV in 
question is a “first violation.” However, it must also be kept in mind 
that disqualification and ineligibility serve different purposes. Dis-
qualification is intended to reinstall a level playing field, i.e. to neu-
tralize the illegal advantage obtained by an athlete in competition 
over his or her competitor. The period of ineligibility, in contrast, 
serves as a deterrent for the athlete concerned and for all other po-
tential offenders. Thus, disqualification and period of ineligibility 
cannot be simply added together when assessing the overall propor-
tionality of the sanction. The more competitions have been distorted, 
the longer the period of disqualification must be in order to prevent 
that harm is being done to the (undoped) competitors.156 
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In the case at hand, the Panel finds that the overall effects of the 
sanction are still proportionate considering the specificities of the 
case. The Athlete has distorted multiple high level competitions, 
damaged numerous other athletes and has breached the applicable 
rules on many occasions using multiple different substances and did 
so in full knowledge of the circumstances. The overall integrity of 
athletics has suffered heavily from the Athlete’s behaviour. Such be-
haviour, thus, warrants a serious sanction. Therefore, the Panel finds 
that in light of the specific circumstances of this case the boundaries 
of public policy are not trespassed, even though technically speaking 
this is a first ADRV.157 
VIII. CAS REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION (IF) 
RETROACTIVE THERAPEUTIC USE EXEMPTION (TUE) DECISIONS 
In Dominguez v. Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), 
despite granting his request for a prospective TUE, the FIA denied a 
driver’s application for a retroactive TUE for two products containing 
amphetamine after his positive in-competition test for this prohibited 
substance because it does not satisfy the “criteria to grant [it] on the 
basis of fairness.”158  But the FIA did not specify any reasons for its 
refusal to provide a retroactive TUE.159 
The Panel determined that an IF must provide a reasoned decision 
for its refusal to grant a retroactive TUE because an athlete has a legiti-
mate expectation to understand the denial, which affects his legal rights 
and defense of an alleged ADRV, and WADA needs to review its re-
fusal.160  Concluding that a denial based only on fairness criteria does 
not provide the required reasoning, the Panel set aside the FIA’s decision 
and referred the driver’s application for a retroactive TUE back to the 
FIA for reconsideration and a reasoned decision in due course.161 
The Panel held that an athlete’s right to CAS review of an IF’s ret-
roactive TUE decision under Article 4.4.7 of the 2015 WADC is not vi-
olated if the IF’s rules effectively preclude de novo consideration of the 
IF’s fairness assessment, which provides appropriate deference to the 
IF’s exercise of discretion given its sport-specific expertise and experi-
ence.162  It concluded that “CAS cannot replace its assessment of fair-
ness” for that of an IF’s TUE Committee, but that “appeals may still be 
 
 157. See id. at 38-39, ¶ 139. 
 158. See Dominguez v. Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile, CAS 2016/A/4772, 
Arbitral Award, 3, ¶¶ 5-14 (2012) (Switz.). 
 159. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 15-16. 
 160. See id. at 26-27, ¶¶ 103-30. 
 161. Id. at 26-27, ¶¶ 124-30. 
 162. Id. at 22, ¶ 99. 
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permitted on the ground that the decision was arbitrary, grossly dispro-
portionate, irrational or perverse or otherwise outside of the margin of 
discretion, or taken in bad faith or [violated the athlete’s] due process 
rights.”163 
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The foregoing review of CAS jurisprudence provides a primer re-
garding several frequent issues in doping cases, including proof of 
ADRV violations by NAP evidence; rebuttal of presumed intentional 
ADRVs; proof of no fault or no significant fault; determination of the 
appropriate period of ineligibility less than a presumptive standard sanc-
tion; and determination of the proper period of disqualified competition 
results and period of ineligibility start date.  It also identifies and de-
scribes two other CAS awards resolving important WADC issues.  
Carter v. IOC determined that the IOC has broad authority retest athlete 
samples from prior Olympic Games for the presence of prohibited sub-
stances.  Dominguez v. FIA held that an IF must provide reasons for 
denying a retroactive TUE and is an example of one of the rare instances 
in which a CAS panel will not exercise de novo review over an IF’s de-
cision in a doping matter. 
 
 163. See id. at 22-23, ¶ 102. 
